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THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FORMATION OF 




The present work addresses the role of UN in the formation of customary international 
law from a constructivist perspective. It dialogues with the International Law 
Commission and, in contrast with the latter, it argues that the importance of the UN is 
a matter to be defined empirically. Its organs are capable of acting as norm 
entrepreneurs, articulating and promoting new norms. They are capable of affecting 
social processes in order to create pressure on the states that resist emergent norms. 
Thus, instead of a mere agent of states the UN is capable of deeply influencing them 
both in behavioural and attitudinal terms. Furthermore, the UN promote the 
formalization and institutionalization of new norms, elucidating their scope, 
application, and embedding them in consistently coherent amalgamation of norms and 
practices. Hence, it is capable of fostering the processes that lead to the crystallization 
of norms as customary international law.  
KEYWORDS 
United Nations; Customary International Law; Constructivism 
1. INTRODUCTION
Customary international law (hereunder CIL) has never ceased to attract the attention 
of international lawyers.1 Since 2012, the topic of its identification is back on the 
International Law Commission’s (ILC) programme of work, under the rapporteurship 
of Sir Michael Wood (SR). The ILC began by affirming that practice and opinio juris of 
states are relevant for the ascertainment of rules of CIL.2  The work combines state-
* Postdoctoral Research Fellow, School of Law, University of São Paulo. The research in connection with this article
is funded by the São Paulo Research Foundation – FAPESP (grant 2015/24219-7), and a significant part of it was 
carried out at the Manchester International Law Centre, School of Law, University of Manchester. Contact: 
sufyan@usp.br. ORCID: 0000-0001-9749-6388.  
1 See e.g. International Law Association, ‘Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) 
International Law’, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, Report of the 
Sixty-Ninth Conference, London (2000) (hereunder the London Statement); International Committee of the Red 
Cross, ‘Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (ICRC, 2007) 30IC/07/ 8.3. 
2 ILC ‘Identification of Customary International Law: text of the Draft conclusions provisionally adopted by the 
Drafting Committee. A/CN.4/L.872’ (UN, 2016) (hereinafter, ‘Draft conclusions’). Draft conclusions: 2[3]. ‘Two 
Link to final published version: 10.1163/18719732-12341348
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centrism with significant caution towards non-state actors in general and international 
organizations in particular.3 The state is emphatically qualified as the primary actor in the 
international sphere and is approached as a unitary entity, whose behaviour and attitude 
should be coherent, lest it be held less relevant in the ascertainment of the existence of 
customary law.4 International organizations, including the UN, play either an 
instrumental role, by providing arenas that facilitate the role of states, or a residual one, 
in which their practice is relevant qua practice of an independent legal person.5 Their 
importance is established on normative grounds: because states ‘create and control 
international organizations’, empowering them to ‘perform, as separate legal persons, a 
variety of functions [it is] premature to equate such normative power [that 
organizations hold] with genuinely autonomous law-making power’ (my italics).6 
Consequently, resolutions of international organizations, notably resolutions of the UN 
General Assembly, are addressed essentially on whether they reflect the practice of 
states.7 Accordingly, there is an attempt to draw a clear distinction between practice of 
the organization, and practice of the states within the organization.8 Moreover, the 
work is markedly formal, notably in sharply distinguishing between lex lata and lege 
ferenda;9 and in differentiating between customary law of an organization and customary 
law of the international community.10  
The present work addresses the role of international organisations, and of the 
UN in particular, in the formation of CIL. In contrast with the ILC, I ascribe a greater 
role to the UN, arguing that its importance is a matter to be defined empirically on a 
case-by-case basis. Instead of a mere agent of states, I argue that the UN is capable of 
deeply influencing them both in behavioural and attitudinal terms. Indeed, I argue that 
its organs and procedures are capable of acting as norm entrepreneurs, i.e., capable of 
articulating new norms, introducing them to the international community, and 
promoting them. In addition, UN organs are capable of affecting social processes in 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
constituent elements. ‘To determine the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, it is necessary 
to ascertain whether there is a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris)’.  
3 ILC Draft conclusions: 4[5] ‘Requirement of practice. 1 … it is primarily the practice of States that contributes to the 
formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law. 2. In certain cases, the practice of international 
organizations also contributes to the formation…  3. Conduct of other actors is not practice … but may be 
relevant when assessing the practice…’. 
4 ILC Draft conclusions: 7[8] 2 ‘Assessing a State’s practice. Where the practice of a particular State varies, the weight to 
be given to that practice may be reduced’. 
5 ILC Draft conclusions: 4[5] 2 (transcribed above in footnote 3). 
6 Michael Wood ‘Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law. A/CN.4/68270’ (New York, UN 
2015), para. 70. Also Michael Wood, ‘International Organizations and Customary International Law’, Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 48 (2015) pp. 613–4. 
7 ILC Draft conclusions : 12[13] 3 ‘A provision in a resolution adopted by an international organization … may 
reflect a rule of customary international law if it is established that the provision corresponds to a general practice 
that is accepted as law  (opinio juris]’. 
8 Michael Wood, ‘Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law’ (New York, UN 2014), para. 71. 
(‘…the practice of international organizations, as separate international legal persons should not be assimilated to 
that of the States themselves…The present report … proceeds on the basis of the determination that, where 
appropriate, the practice of States within international organizations is to be attributed to States themselves’). 
9 ILC, Draft conclusions: 15[16] 1 ‘Persistent Objector. Where a State has objected to a rule of customary international 
law while that rule was in the process of formation, the rule is not opposable to the State concerned for so long as 
it maintains its objection’. Wood, ‘Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law’ para. 28 and 
65. Wood, ‘International Organizations and Customary International Law’, p. 616. 
10 Wood, ‘Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law’, para. 72 and footnote 172. 
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order to create pressure on the states that resist an emergent norm, which I shall refer 
to as recalcitrant states in order to differentiate between them and states that are the first 
to adopt the new norm, which may in turn be referred to as leading states. Consequently, 
through active socialization, UN organs are capable of seriously affecting the material 
behaviour of the state – and the manner that the latter defines itself and its interests – 
in respect to the new norm. Besides, the UN promotes the formalization and 
institutionalization of the new norm, by elucidating its scope, application, and embedding 
it in a consistently coherent amalgamation of norms and practices (institutions). As the 
above suggests, I make a distinction between norm and the behaviour and attitude that 
supports it. In the text, the word norm is employed indistinctively from rule and both 
refer to a prescriptive statement of more restrict (rule proper) or more general 
(principle) character. 
 Although the emphasis in this study is placed on international human rights 
law, the present approach and many of the conclusions reached hereunder are intended 
to be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to other fields of international law. I adopt an 
interdisciplinary approach that draws on methods and instruments that reverberate with 
the international relations (IR) constructivism school.11 From the legal standpoint, the 
approach broadly matches the Hartian school of thought in defining law as a social 
construct.12 This interdisciplinary analysis brings new light to the role of the UN in such 
processes.  
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the IR 
literature on the life cycle of international norms, and starts building the links between 
international norms and norms of CIL by approaching both as social norms. Section 3 
addresses norms of CIL: it concludes the bridging of the concepts and applies the 
theory developed in Section 2 to the study of the development of norms of CIL. 
Section 4 describes the main instruments available for the UN to promote a norm as a 
law (notably, CIL) at the different junctures of its life. Section 5 contains a case study 
whose purpose is merely illustrative.  Section 6 concludes and provides prospects for 
future research. 
																																								 																				
11 Alexander Wendt, 'Collective identity formation and the international state'  American political science review (1994) p. 
384. Ann Florini, 'The evolution of international norms' 40 International Studies Quarterly (1996) p. 363. Martha 
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International norm dynamics and political change' 52 International organization 
(1998) p. 887. Jeffrey T Checkel, 'The constructive turn in international relations theory'  50 World politics (1998) p. 
324. 
12 H.L.A. Hart and others, The Concept of Law (OUP Oxford 2012); Leslie Green, ‘Introduction’ in Ibid; Leslie Green, 
‘The concept of law revisited’ 94:6 Michigan Law Review (1996) pp. 1687-1717; Jean D'Aspremont, Herbert Hart in 
Post-Modern International Legal Scholarship (2012).  
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2. SETTLING THE GROUNDS OF THE WORK: INTERNATIONAL 
NORMS, DEFINITION AND LIFE-CYCLE  
The IR literature struggles with different concepts of an international norm.13 I adopt 
the sociological oriented definition of norm prevalent in the constructivist literature, 
which posits that an international norm is ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for 
actors with a given identity’.14 This definition emphasises appropriateness and relates it to 
a specific identity. Further, implicit in the definition is the notion that one only knows 
what is appropriate by reference to the normative and ideational dimensions of a 
community.15 Besides, the definition differentiates between the norm and the behaviour 
that it commands or empowers, which permits the ascertainment of the effect of the 
former on the latter.16 Finally, it helps in the transition to the definition of a norm of 
CIL, as becomes clear in the next Section.  
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink wrote one of the most cited works in 
the international relations constructivist literature, which also contains the most 
compelling description of the life cycles of international norms. They identify three 
distinctive stages, namely, emergence, cascade, and internalization. 17 
 The first stage, emergence, begins with the rising of the new norm. They 
acknowledge that norms may appear out of ‘chance occurrences’,18 but emphasise cases 
in which norms are ‘actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate … 
behaviour in their communities’.19 They argue that the role of entrepreneurs seems 
greater at the early stages of the emergence of an international norm. These are agents 
whose methods are often very sophisticated and rational, and who make ‘means-ends 
calculations’ in order to change the way that their targets (in the present case, states and 
international organizations) see themselves and their interests.20 To that purpose, they 
define problems, frame the range of acceptable solutions, identify the main actors, 
articulate new norms and promote them. They aim at persuading their targets that the 
emerging norm requires an appropriate, legitimate behaviour and that complying with 
the norm is in their interest.21 It is important to note that the role of norm-
entrepreneurs becomes significant within a constructivist framework. This is so because 
constructivism assumes that identities are learned through the social processes. Because 
the identities of states change, their interests also change.22 Hence, entrepreneurs try to 
																																								 																				
13 Annika Björkdahl, 'Norms in international relations: Some conceptual and methodological reflections' 15 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs (2002) p. 9 
14 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International norm dynamics and political change'; Peter J Katzenstein, The culture of 
national security: Norms and identity in world politics (Columbia University Press 1996) p. 42.  
15 See generally Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International norm dynamics and political change'. See footnote 130, below, 
and accompanying text. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’. 
18 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International norm dynamics and political change' p. 896. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. p.910. 
21 Note that the norm truly arises as the community begin to share the understanding that the new standards are in 
fact appropriate. It is beyond the present scope to ascertain when such moment occurs. 
22 Christian Reus-Smit, The politics of international law, 96 Cambridge University Press (2004) chap. 1. 
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focus their targets’ attention on certain issues or even create new issues.23 They do this 
by working on the meaning of those issues, framing them in a manner that resonates 
with the existing understandings shared by their targets – although they can and often 
do challenge those understandings.24  
Emphasising the emerging norm may affect the manner in which states identify 
themselves and define their interests.25 As Richard Price explains, there is a recursive 
effect of the emerging norm on the states.26 It is often the case that norm-entrepreneurs 
promote the new norm using mechanisms of persuasion. As the leading states become 
convinced that a norm matches their ethical expectations and their interests, they may 
adapt their behaviour to comply with the norm. This in turn, strengthens the emerging 
norm and creates social pressure on other states to conform their behaviour to the new 
norm. At this moment, a caveat becomes necessary. The articulation and promotion of 
the norm may be a product of a rational, deliberate decision — however, the generation 
of CIL continues to be spontaneous and unintentional. It will depend on how deep the 
processes of articulation and promotion of new norms affect the behaviour and attitude 
of the States towards the norm. 
 Finnemore and Sikkink claim that, once norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a 
critical mass of actors to adopt the new norm, adoption by followers often cascades 
down.27 Once this ‘tipping point’ has been reached, the rationale changes significantly. 
Other mechanisms come to play a relevant role in moving recalcitrant states to adopt 
the norm, namely, material rewards, sanctions, and socialization, which is of most 
interest here. The two authors highlight ‘active socialization’ as the primary mechanism 
in norm cascade.28 They argue that empirical studies in different fields of international 
law suggest that social pressure leads target states to adopt a norm because they seek 
international legitimacy or wish to demonstrate that they belong to a community with a 
certain identity (e.g. liberal states).29 Once a number of states has adopted the norm, 
socialization creates increasing pressure on other states and often causes them to adapt 
their behaviour vis-à-vis the norm. This may occur irrespective of the conviction of 
states as to whether the norm is legitimate or even promotes their interests. Once 
adopted by a state, i.e., once the state has adapted its behaviour to comply with the 
norm, I argue that the state will continue to comply with it, pursuant to the principle of 
inertia.30 Furthermore, the norm may trigger different processes that progressively 
																																								 																				
23 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 897. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Antje Wiener, “The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance beyond the State: Sociological and Normative 
Approaches to ‘Interaction,’” 10:1 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (2007) p.  47–69. 
26 Richard Price, ‘Emerging Customary Norms and Anti-Personnel Landmines’ in Christian Reus-Smit (ed.), The 
Politics of International Law (2004). Contrast with Eric Posner and Jack L. Goldsmith, ‘Understanding the 
Resemblance between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law’, 40 Virginia Journal of International 
Law (2000), pp. 639, 641 and 662. 
27 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ p. 901.  
28 Ibid. p. 902. 
29 Ibid; Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing states: Promoting human rights through international law (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) pp. 307–14. 
30 Chaim Perelman, The New Rhetoric (Springer, 1971) pp. 105–7. (On the ‘principle of inertia’ which allows one to 
assume that once adopted, the behaviour will continue to be adopted, because change will require justification). 
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create within organs and institutions of the state the conviction of appropriateness, of 
obligation or conformance with their interests.31   
Further, the authors note that it is often the case that emergent norms are 
institutionalized before they reach the cascade stage.32 They note that ‘since 1948 
emergent norms have increasingly become institutionalized in international law, in rules 
of multilateral organizations, and in bilateral agreements’.33 They also argue that the 
institutionalization process often clarifies the scope of the norm, the precise meaning of 
violations, and the sanctioning process for violators. I submit that the manner that the 
norm is institutionalised paves the way for it to acquire customary law status and, 
consequently, that it is at the stage of institutionalisation that the norm is most likely to 
be identified, for the first time, as CIL.34 
Finally, at the more mature stages of its life cycle, States take the norm for 
granted and comply with it without questioning its appropriateness. This is the stage of 
internalization, to which I come back later in the text.35 As explained in the 
Introduction, the framework above may explain the formation of norms of CIL, and 
provide new avenues to explain how the UN and other organizations may affect the life 
cycle of the norm. The fundament for the application of the above theory to the 
emergence and development of CIL consists in that both international norms and 
norms of CIL may be defined as social norms. Besides, from the international relations 
point of view, a norm of CIL may be defined as an international norm that undergoes a 
certain type of specialisation: the norm that lawyers define, use and treat as CIL.36 This 
definition emphasises that law – and CIL – is a social construct37 and, notably, the 
construct of a specific community.38 I submit that, as the international norm evolves, it 
may be referred to as a legal norm and, more to the point, as a norm of CIL – the next 
Section looks at the progressive shaping of a norm as CIL.  
3. THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF NORMS OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The processes that Section 2 briefly describes are dynamic and encompass the 
movement from non-law to law: how social norms may progressively acquire the 
character of CIL. In order to describe this movement, a full genealogy of the norm may 
require the identification of the act that firstly articulated it as an international norm. 
The analysis may proceed with the description of the processes that led to the act that 
																																								 																				
31 Harold Hongju Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” 106:8 The Yale Law Journal (1997) pp. 2599–
2659; Harold Hongju Koh, “Internalization through Socialization,” Duke Law Journal (2005) pp. 975–82. 
32 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ p. 900. 
33 Ibid. 
34 See Sections 3, 4 and 5 below. 
35 See Subsection 3.4 below. 
36 Martha Finnemore, 'Are legal norms distinctive' 32 NYUJ Int'l L & Pol (1999) pp. 699 and 703 (‘Another possible 
reason why legal norms may be particularly powerful in world politics arises from professional norms and the fact 
that so many foreign policy makers now have legal training’) 
37 Hart and others, The Concept of Law; also Green ‘Introduction’ in ibid.  
38 Ibid.  
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first articulated the norm as CIL, to which I refer to as promulgative articulation, 
adopting the terminology coined by d’Amato.39 This owes to the fact that compliance 
may acquire a legal connotation and non-compliance may require legal justification.  
The movement from non-law to law is markedly fluid. Hence, it is difficult, if at 
all possible, to pinpoint the moment at which a customary legal norm emerges.40 
However, the determination of that moment is not of relevance here. Rather, I argue 
that the description of how certain norms are progressively used as legal norms provides 
evidence as to the norms in question acquiring legal character. The use of a norm as law 
– inclusive CIL – leaves traces of at least two types: high degrees of formalisation 
especially in terms of language and specific types of institutionalisation. As Onuf posits, 
‘prescriptive statements enjoying some degree of formality and institutional support are 
legal’.41 Similarly, Friederich Kratochwil argues that it is its use in a distinct manner that 
distinguishes law. 42 As Kratochwil cogently demonstrates, the path of legal arguments 
has very distinctive characteristics. Notably, Kratochwil explains that legal reasoning is 
a subcategory of rhetorical and practical reasoning, which is marked inter alia by the 
characterization of actions as legal types with specialized topoi, which often provide the 
content of legal principles.43 This leads to the question of what type of formalisation 
and institutionalisation provides evidence of CIL. I argue that this question can only be 
answered by looking at how international law professionals define CIL.  
The mainstream definition of CIL is reflected in the work of the SR and the 
ICL. The SR suggested and the Commission agreed that the Conclusions resort to the 
language in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which 
allows that organ to apply ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law’.44 Nevertheless, I submit that the expression ‘practice accepted as law’ 
leads to mistakes and triggers confusions. I argue that both practice and opinio must 
support a norm for the latter to acquire the character of CIL.45 The SR attempts to 
																																								 																				
39 Anthony A. d'Amato, The concept of custom in international law (Cornell University Press 1971) 
40 See J Crawford, “The Identification and Development of Customary International Law” p. 11. (‘...it is nearly 
impossible to identify with precision the exact point in time the [customary international law rule] was created. 
The creation of customary international law is not momentary. It emanates from an “intensive dialectical process” 
between different actors of the international society’). Moreover, see Michael Wood, “Fourth Report on 
Identification of Customary International Law” para. 17 (responding to the delegations of some states, which, 
reacting to the work of the Commission, affirmed the difficulty  ‘that often arises in identifying the precise 
moment when a critical mass of practice accompanied by acceptance as law (opinio juris) has accumulated, and a 
rule of customary international law has thus come into being’. Wood noted that ‘the draft conclusions seek to 
provide guidance as to whether, at a given moment, it may be said that such processes had occurred’).  
41 Nicholas Onuf, 'The constitution of international society' 5 European Journal of International Law (1994) p.  1. 
42 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International 
Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
43 Ibid., chap. 8. 
44 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Treaty Series N. 993, 1945, article 38, 1, (b).  The decision to rely on this 
provision of the Statute is questionable given the fact that this provision was poorly drafted. See Jean 
d'Aspremont, The Decay of Modern Customary International Law in Spite of Scholarly Heroism, SSRN Scholarly Paper. 
Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network (2015).  
45 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise. Vol. 1. Peace (1905) p. 22–3. (‘Wherever and as soon as a certain 
frequently adopted international conduct is considered legally necessary or legally right, the rule, which may be 
abstracted from such a conduct, is a rule of customary International Law’. My italics); László Blutman, “Conceptual 
Confusion and Methodological Deficiencies: Some Ways That Theories on Customary International Law Fail,” 
25:2 European Journal of International Law (2014) p. 535. (‘State practice, as a practice-like phenomenon, does not 
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prevent any terminological problems by adopting the terms ‘customary international 
law’ and ‘rules of customary international law’.46 However, because he resorts to the 
Statute language of ‘practice accepted as law’,47 the terminology at times becomes 
obscure given the confusion of the material element with the legal norm.48  In any case, 
this definition of norms of CIL – norms supported by the behaviour and opinio of a 
collective of States – suggests the type of formalisation and institutionalisation that 
provide cues as to the emergence of a norm. Among the types of formalisation, I 
underline that States may justify their behaviour in respect to the emergent norm; some 
of their organs may refer to the norm as law; they may invoke the norm before 
international courts and tribunals, which then face the challenge of ascertaining 
whether the norm is law. In this process, the norm becomes institutionalised, i.e., 
embedded in coherent systems of norms and practices. Certain types of 
institutionalisation occur within international organisations and, notably, within the 
UN: resolutions fix and clarify the norm and the operational activities strengthen it in 
practice. 
The Section that follows describes in more detail how social norms 
progressively acquire the shape of CIL. I then examine the opinio and finally, at the 
ascertainment of norms of CIL.  
3.1. The progressive construction of behaviour and opinio 
With customary norms being dependent on behaviour, there seems to be an ontological 
paradox in defining as CIL a norm that faces widespread violations or ambivalent 
behaviour. Yet, this is frequently the case with emergent norms: compliance with it is 
inconsistent across the community and often within the individual state. However, this 
is a paradox only insofar as the behaviour is ascertained without regard to the attitude 
of states in respect to the norm. Richard Price posits that a violation will not be 
harmful to the norm if 
the transgressor feels compelled to justify (or deny) the violation because of 
mutually shared expectations that such behaviour is normally unacceptable and 
requires defence to reconfirm the status of the violator as a legitimate member 
of international society.49 
That is reminiscent of, yet different from, the approach taken by the ICJ in Nicaragua.50 
The difference is that Price brings a new perspective when suggesting that the non-
compliant behaviour in that specific context may in fact indicate that the norm is 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
take the form of a norm in itself. I am of the view that it is not state practice but, rather, the rule or regularity of 
which state practice is a manifestation that can be accepted as law’). 
46 ILC ‘Draft conclusions: 1 Scope. The present draft conclusions concern the way in which the existence and content 
of rules of customary international law are to be determined’. 
47 ILC ‘Draft conclusions: 2[3] (See footnote 2 above). 
48 In fact, the problem is more complex: ‘norm’ and ‘rule’ may be defined as referring to existing ‘uniform 
behaviour’. See Florini, 'The evolution of international norms'; Green, ‘Introduction’. 
49 Price, ‘Emerging Customary Norms and Anti-Personnel Landmines’, 114. 
50 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, Judgment ICJ 
Reports 1986 para. 186. 
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transitioning from the realm of politics to that of law, because an emergent norm may 
require justification of the nonconforming behaviour.51 I argue that it may require a 
specific type of justification, i.e., justification in legal terms. Then, rather than assessing 
whether the practice of organs of one state is uniform in supporting the norm,52 the 
appropriate exercise for the ascertainment of the formation of a customary 
international legal rule requires an assessment of the reasons for actions taken by the 
different organs. In other words, there is a need to ascertain the legal reasons state 
organs put forward for justifying their behaviour in respect of the norm. In this sense, 
in contrast with both the SR and the Commission, I maintain that it is not appropriate 
to ascertain behaviour independently of attitude:53 they should be approached as one 
and the same reality; and that the inconsistency in individual and collective behaviour 
and attitude should not, automatically, count as a negative factor. There may be trends 
in the individual and general behaviour and attitude that permit one to ascertain 
whether the norm is undergoing a process of strengthening or weakening. 
 Moreover, the strength of the emerging norm will vary pursuant to the stage of 
its life cycle and the context in which it is emerging. Often compliance by the leading 
states is likely to generate social pressure on other states. Accordingly, the adoption of 
the norm by a critical mass of states may increase the pressure on the recalcitrant states 
to adopt the norm qua customary law. Adoption of the norm refer to different 
phenomena – states may conform with the norm out of a belief that it is law, or they 
have a more nuanced attitude towards the norm, or even fail to adapt their behaviour 
but justify their non-conformance in legal terms. In fact, it is often the case that organs 
of both states and international organizations give in to socialization pressures and 
adopt the behaviour described by the norm without accepting that it is required under 
international law, but by providing justification in a legal language that paves the way of 
the norm acquiring that character.54 Besides, highly politicised contexts may create 
overarching ‘pulls of obligation’,55 which become more demanding as leading states and 
non-state actors increase pressure on recalcitrant states.56According to Price, 
politicization may ‘raise the threshold for violations, so much so that the burden of 
proof clearly is reversed in favour’ of the behaviour described in the norm.57 Arguably 
in such circumstances, it becomes increasingly difficult for any given (organ of a) state 
or organization to justify its nonconforming behaviour with the emerging rule. Note 
that giving in to such pulls does not necessarily mean believing that the norm is CIL, 
which is the topic of the next Subsection. 
																																								 																				
51 Price, ‘Emerging Customary Norms and Anti-Personnel Landmines’ p. 114. 
52 ILC, Draft conclusions: 7 [8] (footnote 4, above). 
53 ILC Draft conclusions: 3[4] (2) ‘Each element is to be separately ascertainment. This requires an assessment of 
evidence of each element’. 
54 Price, ‘Emerging Customary Norms and Anti-Personnel Landmines’ p. 124. 
55 Ibid. 
56 For instance, note how Scobbie describe the potential that social pressure may make it difficult for state to 
disregard the rules articulated by the ICRC. Iain GM Scobbie, “The Approach to International Customary Law in 
the Study,” in Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, ed. Elizabeth Wilmshurst 
and Susan Breau (Cambridge University Press, 2007) p. 21. 
57 Price, ‘Emerging Customary Norms and Anti-Personnel Landmines’ p. 123. 
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 I argue that the processes described above may have a strong impact on the 
parameters of lawfulness and legitimacy, prevalent in the community, respecting the 
behaviour that the emerging norm regulates. Recalling Bruno Simma’s well-known 
opinion in Kosovo regarding the degrees of non-prohibition,58 I argue that behaviour not 
in conformance with the emerging norm may be accepted as ‘not illegal’ – and 
therefore may be tolerated – at the same time that it is refused to be assessed as ‘legal’. 
At a certain point in this latter stage of the process of the emergence of the norm, an 
actor such as an international court hearing a case will be able to affirm that a 
customary international norm exists. The degree of persuasiveness of this affirmation 
will depend on the maturation of the processes described above. A premature 
affirmation will likely fail to persuade other (state and non-state) actors, as is shown by 
the finding by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon that a customary law on terrorism 
existed.59  
Note that, although the framework presented above explains that the first 
persuasive affirmation that an international customary international norm exists does 
not occur in fiat, it fails to solve one of the main problems in CIL: the lack of a reliable 
yardstick to differentiate between law and non-law.60 In respect to CIL, the main 
yardstick is often identified with the element of opinio,61 which is the subject of the next 
Subsection.  
3.2. The mental element in norms of customary international law  
There has been much debate on the nature of opinio.62 Blutman argues that ‘only by the 
help of the terms denoting some mental act or mental state (acceptance, opinio juris, 
consent, belief and so on) may one ascribe normative (legal) aspect to the (non-
normative) regularity displayed in practice’.63 Blutman also argues that ‘it is crucial to 
properly single out the specific mental state or act that provides the best explanatory 
framework for the nature and operation of customary international law’.64  
However, I submit that it is difficult, if at all possible, to single out a ‘specific 
mental state’ at the stage of the emergence of the norm. Indeed, the International Law 
Association explains that ‘once a customary rule has become established, States will 
																																								 																				
58 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo ICJ Reports 2010. 
59 UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Appeals Chamber) Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis, 16 February 201, para. 85 et seq. (‘The 
conclusion is therefore warranted that a customary rule has evolved in the international community concerning 
terrorism’). For a critique of this finding, see Kai Ambos, “Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: 
Is There a Crime of Terrorism under International Law?,” 24:3 Leiden Journal of International Law (2011) pp. 655–75; 
Ben Saul, “Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an 
International Crime of Transnational Terrorism,” 24:3 Leiden Journal of International Law (2011) pp. 677–700. 
60 d’Aspremont, “The Decay of Modern Customary International Law in Spite of Scholarly Heroism” p. 16. 
61 ILC Draft conclusions: 9[10].2 ‘A general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris) is to be distinguished from 
mere usage or habit’. 
62 László Blutman, 'Conceptual Confusion and Methodological Deficiencies: Some Ways that Theories on 
Customary International Law Fail' p. 538 (The author explores the differences between the definitions of opinio, 
most notably, between opinio as acceptance and as belief). 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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naturally have a belief in its existence: but this does not necessarily prove that the 
subjective element needs to be present during the formation of the rule’. 65 Likewise, 
Lachs submits that ‘to postulate that all States, even those which initiate a given 
practice, believe themselves to be acting under a legal obligation is to resort to a 
fiction’.66  More to the point, Kelsen notes that at the stage of formation of the norm, 
States ‘need not believe that it is a legal norm which they apply’.67 Hence, the 
formalistic model adopted that marks the work of the SR68 does not provide a fair 
account of how opinio forms, or how it evolves at the stages when the norm in question 
is not yet a legal norm.  
The search for a ‘specific mental state’, propelled by the feeling that both 
elements must necessarily be clearly distinguishable, has been and is likely to remain 
elusive. The reason is that different ‘mental states’ coexist in the community of States 
and even within the same State.69 Most certainly, at the early stages on the life cycle of a 
norm, the mental element that predominates within the group of the leading States is 
an attitude towards the norm that sees it as appropriate: as broadly matching the legal 
and ideational structures of the community. In this respect, the existence of the 
different mental states is not a negative factor, because, as explained, it may indicate the 
transition of the norm to the ‘legal realm’. Perhaps the term ‘attitude’, which I have 
been employing, describes, better than opinio, the phenomenon to which they both refer 
(the mental element). By definition, attitude is ‘a mental position with regard to a fact or 
state’70; ‘a feeling or opinion about something or someone, or a way of behaving that is 
caused by this’71.  
On the one hand, attitude depends on the individual and collective identities 
and interests of the States. On the other, within the community, the attitude of some 
States may shape that of others. Because the mainstream approach assumes that the 
identities and interests of the States are fixed, it fails to appreciate the depth at which 
the attitude of the community may change throughout the period of formation of a 
new norm. Wendt resorted to the concept of ‘reflected appraisals’ to explain one of the 
																																								 																				
65 International Law Association, Final Report of the Committe. Statement of the Principles Applicable to the Formation of 
General Customary International Law, 2000) 7 
66 International Court of Justice, ‘North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969 pp. 3, 231 (Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Lachs). Contrast with Draft conclusion n.9 [10] (‘1. The requirement, as a constituent element 
of customary international law, that the general practice be accepted as law (opinio juris) means that the practice in 
question must be undertaken with a sense of legal obligation’). 
67 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2003) p. 307. In his critique to Kelsen, 
d’Amato assumes that legal norms and social norms must be set perfectly apart and, resorting to Geny, he claims 
that it is opinio that sets them apart. See Anthony A. d'Amato, The concept of custom in international law (Cornell 
University Press 1971) 49.  
68 Michael Wood, Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law, 2014), para. 61 et seq. 
69 In order to ascertain the existence of different mental elements within the same State, there is the need to go 
beyond the ‘billiard ball’ model of the State, which assumes that, as a legal person, it is unitary. In reducing the 
weight of the opinio of a State in cases in which its different organs display different attitudes towards the norm of 
customary international law, Michael Wood adopts this model. The same model is adopted by much of the 
international relations scholarship, inclusive of the constructivist extract (for all, Alexander Wendt, 'The state as 
person in international theory' 30 Review of International Studies (2004) p. 289).  
70 Inc. Staff Merriam-Webster, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Turtleback Books 2005) 
71 E. Walter and Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary (Cambridge University Press 
2005) 
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main processes that can occur in the socialization of States. Pursuant to Wendt, States 
‘form identities by learning, through interaction, to see themselves as others do’ and 
‘the more significant these others are […] the faster and deeper the process works’.72 
Accordingly, the more important a leading State is to a recalcitrant State, the deeper the 
learning process becomes, as the recalcitrant State learns another identity, which leads it 
to redefine its interests and consequently change its opinio in respect of an emerging 
norm. In this context, the UN emerges as a player of weight in these processes. 
Because it is an autonomous social actor with legal capacity and political legitimacy, the 
UN is capable of affirming an emerging norm in its resolutions and procedures and, 
consequently, affecting the attitude of recalcitrant states.  
3.3. The formal ascertainment of behaviour and opinio 
From the sociological standpoint, it is possible to observe that the legal authority – a 
renowned publicist, an international organ, an international court or tribunal – may find 
it difficult to distinguish clearly between emerging and fully emerged norms of CIL. It 
is possible to see that the legal authority makes some decisions – which constitute 
politico-legal decisions – when ascertaining the existence of a given norm. In the 
making of such decisions, the authority enjoys a significant degree of autonomy. 
Evidently, the authority must ensure that decision-making follows the standards — 
which are politico-legal standards – accepted by the international legal community. In 
other words, the affirmation made by the authority that a rule of CIL exists, results 
from a politico-legal decision that relies on technical – as well as rhetorical – arguments. 
It is not a sociological ascertainment of the behaviour and attitude that is prevalent in 
the community of States. The authority makes the decision on standards accepted by 
the international legal community and the ILC Draft conclusions constitute an obvious 
example of these standards. Standards like these aim at securing an outcome that is 
capable of best reflecting the general behaviour and opinio of the States. However, the 
outcome does not need to pass the threshold of the sociological observation of the 
general practice and opinio in order to be legally valid. The authority often infers the opinio 
from the evidence it collects or that other actors submit to it; and induces the general 
behaviour in the community from the behaviour of certain States.73 
The review of the case law seems to corroborate this understanding. For 
instance, see how Judge Armand-Ugon concluded that the right to passage over Indian 
Territory was CIL.74 There are three aspects of the argument put forward by Judge 
Armand-Ugon: one factual and two normative. First, there is the fact that Portugal 
enjoyed passage for long period in a peaceful manner. Second, there is the principle of 
effectiveness and, third, what the Judge calls the principle, but I should refer to as the 
legal topos, that ascertains ‘that a state of things which actually exists and has existed for 
																																								 																				
72 Wendt, 'Collective identity formation and the international state'  p. 390. 
73 See for instance, Crawford, The Identification and Development of Customary International Law (2014) (explaining the 
different manners employed by the ICJ to affirm the existence of customary international law). 
74 Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits), Judgment I.C.J. Reports 1960  p. 6. 
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a long time should be changed as little as possible’.75 In any case, Judge Armand-Ugon 
infers that the States had a ‘belief in the respect of the long established practice’ and 
because of the belief that their shared, the right to passage ‘acquires binding force and 
assumes the character of law’.76 
Consequently, two aspects become salient. On the one hand, the legal authority 
may define as CIL a clearly strong social norm, which counts with widespread 
behavioural and attitudinal support. This exercise matches the classic view of CIL, 
which focuses on the spontaneity of the processes of appearance and development of 
norms of CIL. However, on the other hand, a more complex process may also occur 
— and I argue that it has been occurring more often in the past decades given the 
growing participation of international organisations and other non-State actors in the 
production of international law. 
 This latter process is only visible if the legal scholar accepts the premise that 
not only behaviour and attitude generates a norm of CIL; but that also a norm, which is 
not CIL yet, may generate behaviour and shape attitude. In this latter process, the legal 
authority may affirm the existence of a norm of CIL that, in sociological terms, finds 
weak support in the general behaviour or attitude of the States. Recently, for instance, 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon found that the prohibition of terrorism is CIL.77 Legal 
theorists have been trying to address the imperfections in the ‘findings’ of CIL.78 In 
these cases, the affirmation by the legal authority that a norm is CIL is likely to 
strengthen the norm as a social norm.   
In brief, international norms and legal norms may be defined as social norms 
which underwent processes of specialisation. Hence, the advancements made by the IR 
constructivist literature are, a priori, applicable for the understanding of the emergence 
of a norm of CIL. Nevertheless, there will be a need to differentiate between the 
emergence of an international norm and a norm of CIL. I proposed that this 
differentiation be made through the observance of level of formalisation and 
institutionalisation of the norm. Further, I noted that it would be impossible, in the 
incipient stages of the life-cycle of a norm, to identify opinio in the strict sense of the 
term. Still, it may be possible to identify a general attitude in the community, and even 
within the same state.  The fragmentary behaviour of the community must be 
approached neutrally, because it may indicate that the norm in question is acquiring the 
character of CIL. Finally, I noted that the authority that ascertains the existence of a 
norm of CIL does not engage in an exercise in sociology, but in a politico-legal exercise 
that must respect the standards accepted in the community.  
																																								 																				
75  Ibid, Dissending Opinion of Judge Armand-Ugon. 
76 Ibid. 
77 See footnote 59 above. 
78 For instance, Frederic L. Kirgis, 'Custom on a sliding scale' American Journal of International Law (1987) p. 146. 
DROUBI, THE UN AND FORMATION OF CIL 
	
14 
3.4. Internalisation: is it a requirement for the existence and ascertainment of 
customary international law? 
The ascertainment of internalization may become a complex sociological exercise if it 
looks at the manner that the norm affects the organs of the state and other domestic 
actors.79 Consequently, while evidence of strong internalisation would also provide 
evidence of opinio and practice, legal authorities do not need to identify strong 
internalization to confirm that a norm is CIL.80 I argue that the degree of internalisation 
that is relevant for the confirmation of practice and opinio constitutes internalisation by 
the organs of the state. As the Draft Conclusions explain, ‘State practice consists of 
conduct of the State, whether in the exercise of its executive, legislative, judicial or 
other functions’.81 The Draft Conclusions implicitly apply the same rationale to opinio. 
The IR literature often refers to this level of internalisation as respecting the elites of 
the States.82  
4. THE UN AS AN ARTICULATOR AND PROMOTER OF THE NORM  
Among the instruments available for the UN to promote an international norm at the 
different stages, I highlight norm-entrepreneurship, institutionalization and active 
socialization.  
4.1. Emergence stage: norm-entrepreneurship 
The Secretary-General (SG) is frequently described as the norm entrepreneur par 
excellence in the UN system,83 but I argue that others also may function as such, e.g. the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights and special procedures. Given the limits of this 
work, focus in placed on the Secretary-General as the chief administrative office of the 
UN (UN Charter, article 97), who acts in that capacity in all meetings of the other 
organs, and performs the tasks that they may ascribe to him or her.  
The SG enjoys certain autonomy and legal authority that makes him or her a 
player of weight in the promotion of norms. Indeed, Hammarskjold argued that, in the 
spirit of the Charter, the SG is expected to act without guidance from the other organs 
‘should this appear to him necessary in order to help in filling a vacuum that may 
appear in the systems which the Charter and traditional diplomacy provide for the 
safeguarding of peace and security’.84 Likewise, Sheeran makes a powerful case that the 
SG is ‘normatively and independently constrained under the Charter, including by the 
																																								 																				
79 Jeffrey T Checkel, 'Why comply? Social learning and European identity change' 55 International organization (2001) p. 
553; Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Internalization through Socialization’, Duke Law Journal (2005) pp. 975–82; Koh, ‘Why 
Do Nations Obey International Law?’ 106:8 The Yale Law Journal (1997) pp. 2599–2659. 
80 Similarly, Goodman and Jinks, Socializing States, pp. 161 et seq.   
81 ILC Draft conclusions: 5 [6]. 
82 Jeffrey T. Checkel ‘Norms, institutions, and national identity in contemporary Europe’ 43:1 International Studies 
Quarterly (1999) p. 88. 
83 Ian Johnstone, “The Secretary-General as Norm Entrepreneur,” in Secretary or General?: The UN Secretary-General in 
World Politics, ed. Simon Chesterman (Cambridge University Press, 2007) pp. 123–38. 
84 James Cockayne and David Malone, 'Relations with the Security Council' in Simon Chesterman (ed), Secretary or 
General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, Cambridge University Press (2007) p. 73 
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Organization’s obligations, when implementing the decisions of the Security Council.85 
The rationale is that the Charter (implicitly) requires the SG to ensure that whichever 
functions he or she is performing or overseeing remains within the limits of what is 
legally acceptable under the Charter, the treaties entered into by the UN and general 
international law as applicable to the UN. Furthermore, insofar as the UN may incur in 
international responsibility for breaches of international law, the SG has an additional 
reason to ensure that the activities under his or her responsibility do not cause such 
breaches.  
By ascertaining what is and what is not compatible with the Charter and 
international law, the SG may in fact be promoting the development of legal rules. 
Johnstone explains that, because of the managerial and political functions, the SG plays 
an important role as ‘norm entrepreneur’, by electing a cause and mobilizing support in 
order to have it ‘crystallized as an accepted standard of behavior’.86 Johnstone studies 
the case of the ‘responsibility to protect’ norm and, adopting a constructivist approach, 
demonstrates how Kofi Annan worked to promote it.  He concludes that the SG is not 
a ‘normative free agent’; that he or she cannot stretch ‘too far from accepted 
understandings’, and that he or she ‘succeeds best when he or she joins emerging 
normative trends […] rather than trying to generate new norms out of the cloth’.87. 
4.2. Cascade stage: Institutionalization 
At the cascade stage, the UN can institutionalise the emergent norm. The obvious 
instrument for the institutionalisation of international norms is resolutions of the UN 
political organs. The literature on the subject is significant.88 The first question is 
whether these resolutions are capable of reflecting general – rather than mere UN – 
customary law. Both Higgins89 and Alvarez diminish the weight of the distinction 
between law of the organization and that of the international community.90 
																																								 																				
85 Scott P. Sheeran, 'A Constitutional Moment?: United Nations Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo'  
8 International Organizations Law Review (2011) p. 55. 
86 Ian Johnstone, 'The Secretary-General as norm entrepreneur' p. 126. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Rosalyn Higgins. The Development of International Law through Political Organs of the United Nations (Oxford University 
Press 1963); Obed Asamoah, "The Legal Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly." 3 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 
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"Enactment of law by international organizations" 41 Brit. YB Int'l L. (1965) p. 198; Constantin Economides "Les 
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a la Consolidation de Regles Coutumieres" 37 Rev. BDI (2004) p. 552; Marko Divac Öberg "The Legal Effects of 
Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ." 16:5 European 
Journal of International Law (2005) p. 879-906.  
89 Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law through Political Organs of the United Nations p. 3–4. (‘How, in 
practice, do political bodies such as these contribute to the development of international law? These organs are 
called upon, in the course of their ordinary work, to interpret their own constitution [i.e. the UN Charter]. This 
constitution not only is an international treaty, but also contains many accepted concepts of international law. 
Interpretative decisions inevitably must reflect upon the meaning of international law. Moreover, even the 
decisions on the internal workings of the United Nations, on its constitutional powers under the Charter, 
ultimately reflect on general international law…’). 
90 J. E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford University Press, 2005), 143–83. (On page 144, he 
affirms the need to ‘de-emphasize the importance of the internal/external distinction and recognize that many if 
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Accordingly, I de-emphasize this distinction for the task of the identification of emerging 
customary norms.91  
Higgins articulates what is likely the most comprehensive and well-known 
theory on the manner that resolutions of the UN can promote CIL. She explains that 
resolutions may, inter alia, recommend the adoption of new law; declare existing law, 
confirm what the law is, notably in case of competing claims, and apply specific law to 
particular situations.92  Given space constraints, it is not possible to look at all these 
effects in detail. Scholars who looked at the subject tend to agree that resolutions may 
promote the emergence of new CIL or declare (reflect) existing CIL, which largely 
coincides with some of the conclusions adopted by the ILC.93 Having said this, there is 
not agreement in respect to several other aspects – notably, as to whether a resolution 
may create new law per se.94 In any case, even when they have recommendatory 
character, these resolutions trigger the obligation for the states to react in good faith, 
which in practice may signify that uncompliant states need to justify themselves.95 
Hence, there is a need to place each resolution in its proper context, and scholars tend 
to look at the vote tallying and declarations made by the representatives of the states in 
order to determine said context. However, although necessary, this is insufficient. I 
argue that the resolution must be properly contextualised within the practice – the 
operational activities – of the UN.96 Furthermore, I submit that resolutions stating the 
same norms do not necessarily reflect the same stage in the development of these norms. 
The first of the resolutions in a series of resolutions will hardly constitute the pinnacle 
of the processes of institutionalization. Different resolutions in the same series may 
simply constitute milestones in the process of crystallization of a norm as a legal 
customary norm – early resolutions may simply articulate the norm; later resolutions 
may clarify its scope, while more mature reflect its full institutionalization.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
not most decisions made by IOs have both internal and external normative impacts in the sense of affecting both 
matters once deemed to be within internal administrative law as well as other, ostensibly, more “substantive”, rules 
of international law’. Then he uses Higgins framework to review more recent cases and concludes [p. 148] that 
UN organs ‘continue to be law-makers in the sense that Higgins described so well, even if the resulting law has 
moved in ways that she did not anticipate’)  
91 In contrast, see Michael Wood, “Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law”, para. 72. 
(‘Another distinction to be made is that between conduct of the organization that relates to the internal operation 
of the organization … and conduct of the organization in its relations with States, international organizations and 
other (external practice). While the former may in certain circumstances give rise to “a kind of customary law of 
the organization, formed by the organization and applying only to the organization”’ it is in principle the latter that 
may be relevant to the formation and identification of customary international law’ – my italics). 
92 Rosalyn Higgins, The development of international law by the political organs of the United Nations. 
93 ILC Draft conclusions: 12[13] ‘2. A resolution adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental 
conference may provide evidence for establishing the existence and content of a rule of customary international 
law, or contribute to its development.  3. A provision in a resolution adopted by an international organization or at 
an intergovernmental conference may reflect a rule of customary international law if it is established that the 
provision corresponds to a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris).’ 
94 Contrast the ILA London Statement, para. 32 (’Resolutions accepted unanimously or almost unanimously, and 
which evince a clear intention on the part of their supporters to lay down a rule of international law, are capable, very 
exceptionally, of creating general customary law by the mere fact of their adoption’) with the ILC Draft conclusion 
12[13] 1 (‘A resolution adopted by an international organization … cannot, of itself, create a rule of customary 
international law’). See, below in the present article, footnote 102 and accompanying text. 
95 CJR Dugard, 'The Legal Effect of United Nation Resolutions on Apartied' 83 S African LJ (1966) p. 44. See 
footnotes 51-9 above and accompanying text. 
96 Similarly, see Ian Johnstone "Law-making through the operational activities of international organizations" 40 Geo. 
Wash. Int'l L. Rev. (2008) p. 87. 
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4.3. Cascade stage: Active socialization 
Besides, the UN may create social pressure on recalcitrant states through compliance-
inducing mechanisms.97 Among the compliance-inducing instruments that are available 
to the UN, first I highlight those that aim at clarifying the scope of the norm. In this 
respect, reports produced by the Secretariat and by many UN procedures have played 
an important role in clarifying the scope of certain norms. Usually, these reports are 
prepared under certain mandates established by the main political organs. Second, I 
underline the instruments that aim at improving the transparency of the state behaviour 
in respect to the norm, thus, strengthening cultural and social pressures on 
nonconforming behaviour. Mechanisms of verification and monitoring aim at 
improving the transparency of the behaviour of the states in respect to the norm.98 
Verification often aims at identifying delinquent state or non-state actors to enforce 
obligations upon them. Monitoring aims at assessing overall implementation of legal 
obligations by those actors with a view to fine-tuning policies in order to increase 
pressure on nonconforming behaviour. Reporting is an instrument that allows for the 
UN political organs to review and fine-tune their actions. Its importance goes far 
beyond the mere account of facts: the reporting organ often enjoys a considerable 
margin of discretion in defining the problems, framing the range of acceptable 
solutions, articulating and clarifying norms to address the problems, and establishing an 
agenda for future action.  
There are different reasons for non-compliance; and there are different 
instruments available for the UN to induce compliance with emerging norms.99 
Domestic implementation of some norms is more complex and costly than others,100 
which in turn may explain resilience by some organs (e.g. government), while others 
(e.g. judiciary) push for the adoption of the norm. Complexities and costs also vary 
geographically and according to the different realities of each state. The assessment of 
resilience that some states, or some organs of the same state, may have towards the 
norm must differentiate between their clear-cut rejection of it (e.g. in ethical terms, 
which may be addressed by persuasion and socialization) or a justified resistance to it, 
e.g. by the lack of material resources to implement it.101 This type of assessment may 
help the UN in elucidating the reasons (opinio juris) states put forward to justify their 
behaviour at any given moment. Consequently, the Organization may define the 
instruments it must employ to change both opinio and behaviour. For instance, in the 
case of lack of resources, material sanctions would not be an appropriate mechanism, 
but the delivery of technical or material assistance would.  
																																								 																				
97 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty (Harvard University Press, 1998). 
98 Ibid., 184. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Virgilio Afonso da Silva, ‘Do Treaties Matter – Beth Simmons’ Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law 
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Hence, formalisation and institutionalization are continuums that may reflect 
the progressive crystallization of a norm qua CIL. Hence, as mentioned, the first 
affirmation of the norm as CIL is likely to occur as the norm is institutionalised, which, 
in turn, is likely to occur at the stage of cascading. To that extent, I submit that other 
documents, such as statements by the Presidency of the Security Council and landmark 
reports by the Secretary-General, may also play the same role. In a broader context, the 
same may be applicable to the relationship between treaties and emerging custom: 
earlier treaties may – for the purposes of ascertaining the generation of a customary rule 
– articulate it, while later treaties reflect its full institutionalization. It is important to 
note that the rationale above does not work well with the idea that a resolution or even 
a treaty may per se generate CIL.102 This is because the behaviour and attitude of states 
must always be ascertained pursuant to the lines articulated above, which is a thesis that 
is compatible with important conclusions reached by the ILC.103  
5. THE THEORY IN PRACTICE 
In an attempt to give a practical content to the theoretical framework developed earlier, 
this section very briefly looks at the emergence and evolution of the prohibition of 
apartheid as CIL. I argue that this norm is at the late stage of internalisation and, 
consequently, that its study is capable of offering an overview of the application of the 
theory at the different junctures of its life cycle. Given space constrains, the review is 
merely illustrative. 
In a recent article, Dugard and Reynolds argue that the ‘customary status of the 
prohibition of apartheid is indicated by its location within general UN efforts aimed at 
the eradication of all forms of racial discrimination’.104 I would like to place focus on 
certain efforts by the General Assembly, Security Council and Secretary-General in 
promoting and institutionalising the norm, and influencing the behaviour and attitude 
of states in general. 
Apartheid was one of the earliest topics on the agenda of the General 
Assembly.105 It was by the initiative of a group formed by India and twelve other 
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countries, which can be considered the leading states, that the involvement of the 
General Assembly was reinforced.106 In 1952, the Assembly established the 
Commission on the Racial Situation on the Republic of South Africa, requesting inter 
alia that it review the practice of apartheid and its consistency with South Africa’s 
obligations under the Charter.107 The Commission was composed by three individuals 
acting in their own capacity. Their first report provided a clear definition of the 
practices involved with the regime. It also interpreted the human rights provisions in 
the Charter by resorting to resolutions of the Assembly, notably the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and concluded that apartheid violated the Charter and, 
crucially, that it constituted a problem for the whole international community.108 The 
report was considered by the Assembly in a 1953 resolution adopted by 38 to 11 votes, 
with 11 abstentions.109 The conclusions of the Commission framed the debate and 
defined the contours of its developments. Thenceforth, it became clear that the 
contractualist approach to the topic together with the robust principle of domestic 
jurisdiction, which informed the position of South Africa and recalcitrant states, 
clashed with the public law, almost constitutionalist approach, which emphasised 
respect to human rights as a necessary requirement for peace and which informed the 
position of the leading states and the General Assembly.110 Hence, at the stage of 
emergence, the GA provided the norm with scope and legitimacy (by clearly linking it 
to the UN Charter). Note that, at this juncture, it is difficult to define with precision the 
legal nature of the norm: whether an obligation derived from the Charter or an 
emergent norm of CIL that drew its legitimacy from the Charter.  
As mentioned, the Assembly adopted a series of resolutions condemning 
apartheid.111 These resolutions, together with those of the SC mentioned below, 
broadened the scope of the operational activities of the UN on the topic and created 
the institutional framework for the operationalization, clarification and development of 
the norm prohibiting apartheid as CIL. Indeed, the GA recommended that states 
adopted an embargo against the Government of South Africa, making it clear that the 
latter was in violation with a norm of international law.112 Moreover, the GA created a 
subsidiary organ mandated with the task of monitoring the situation and reporting back 
to the GA, the so-called Special Committee against Apartheid,113 which functioned as a focal 
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point for the clarification of the policies of apartheid (hence, for the clarification of the 
scope of the norm prohibiting apartheid) and for creating social pressure on the 
Government of South Africa.114 Also, it requested the SG to provide the necessary 
assistance to the referred Committee and to monitor specific situations.115 
Progressively, the norm gained strength, emerging as customary law. 
In what respects the Council, its first resolution on the regime came in 1960, 
condemning the so called Sharpeville massacre,116 and making it definitely clear that the 
UN had jurisdiction to review the policies of apartheid. Nevertheless, the Council was 
late in adopting mandatory coercive measures because the UK and France were 
adamant that the regime in South Africa respected solely the domestic jurisdiction of 
the country. Only in 1977 the two countries, under increasingly social pressure from 
other states, reverted their positions, and the Council was able to adopt sanctions 
against South Africa.117 In the 1970s and 80s, both the Assembly and the Council 
condemned several acts carried out by the South African Government, and they went 
so far as to declare a newly adopted constitution null and void.118 At this point, I argue 
that the norm prohibiting apartheid was already at the stage of cascading as the more 
recalcitrant states changed their understanding and opposed apartheid. Ultimately, the 
Assembly was able to adopt by consensus the ‘Declaration on Apartheid and its 
Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa’ paving the way for negotiations to end 
the regime and establish democracy.119 I submit that this Declaration reflected the 
standing of the prohibition of apartheid as CIL.  
The role of that the SG played in the present case constitutes a counterfactual 
test in respect to the potential of the SG to serve as norm-entrepreneur.120 However, 
this example does not disprove the ability of the SG to function as norm-entrepreneur; 
rather, it clarifies the scope, the limits of this ability. The main role that the SG played 
was in response to the request made by the SC. In resolution 134 (1960), the SC 
requested the SG ‘in consultation with the Government of the Union of South Africa, 
to make such arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and 
principles of the Charter’.121 Responding to this request, the SC at the time, Dag 
Hammarskjöld, had to deal with a harsh reality. The government of South Africa 
immediately rejected resolution 134 (1960) on grounds that it constituted an illegitimate 
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intromission in the domestic jurisdiction of that country.122 This left Hammarskjöld 
with no alternative but that of resorting to the so-called Peking formula.123 
Consequently, he was in a position closer to that of a mediator,124 who had to rely on 
quiet diplomacy.125 I submit that this was inconsistent with open, vocal norm-
entrepreneurship. Because of the low profile role that he adopted, Hammarskjöld was 
able to establish a channel of communication with the Government of South Africa: he 
was the first SG to visit the country,126 though under a severe restriction of 
movement.127 In these circumstances, the fact that Hammarskjöld managed to convey 
the message that apartheid was contrary to the Charter and that the UN had jurisdiction 
over the issue is telling of his ability to promote a norm even when facing little room to 
act.128 
This very brief case study suggests that the Assembly is capable of affecting the 
development of a norm through its resolutions and operational activities. Without 
clarifying the practices involved in apartheid, and defining that the regime constituted a 
problem for the whole international community, the prohibition could never evolve 
into law. Resolutions of the Assembly were capable of materialising sound legal 
approaches to a topic that, in the 1950s and 60s, was not object of agreement among 
the states. These resolutions became focal points for the development of the debate, 
and insofar as they articulated the prohibition of apartheid, they paved the way for the 
norm to become stronger. Another aspect that the study suggests refers to the 
socialisation, and the creation of social pressure on recalcitrant states. The monitoring 
of the situation by the Special Committee against Apartheid and by the Secretary-
General was important to give salience to the widespread violations of human rights 
carried by the South African Government, which increased politicisation and reinforced 
social pressure.  
Furthermore, the study clarifies that the role of norm-entrepreneur is not fully 
compatible with other functions that the SG may have: insofar as the SG is involved 
with mediation and quiet diplomacy, it may be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
engage in open norm-entrepreneurship.  What is more, the study helps clarify the 
methodology appropriate for the development of future case-studies. There is a need to 
clearly identify the norm subject of the case study and establish its genealogy. This 
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involves tracking the resolutions that affirm it and the reports in which the norm is 
interpreted and clarified. It also involves placing the norm in its legal context, i.e., in 
reference to other norms. In the case study examined here, the strengthening of the 
prohibition meant the weakening of the domestic jurisdiction principle. It also 
necessary to review the institutionalisation efforts carried out by the UN, such as the 
establishment of committees whose activities provide practical meaning to the norm. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to ascertain the compliance inducing instruments employed 
by the UN and the variations of material compliance and attitude of the states that they 
effectively trigger.  
6. CONCLUSION 
To summarize the main arguments suggested in this study, I need to refer to Allot’s 
argument that law has three functions in society.129 It transports society through time; it 
connects the individual behaviour of the members with the common interest of society; 
and it frames the range of possible futures for society. A society constitutes itself 
through law (the legal constituting), ideas (the ideal constituting) and the behaviour of 
its members (the real constituting). Allot asserts that constituting the legal society affects 
the constituting of the ideal and real societies, as much as it is affected by the 
latter. Therefore, law needs a society that has structures and systems, which enable the 
‘mutual conditioning’ of the public and the private minds, and the legal and non-legal.130 
Constructivism offers the most convincing account of these processes because it claims 
that the normative, ideational and material structures of a society all shape the 
behaviour, identities and interests of its actors, states and non-state alike. The 
normative and ideational structures rely on the habitual practices of those actors, who 
are informed social agents and, consequently, those structures are open to 
transformation. The identities of the actors are social constructs because they are learned 
by the actors; identities are not givens: they are endogenous to the social processes and 
vary pursuant to the continued learning by the actors. Consequently, interests and 
behaviour also vary. Hence, understanding the actors’ behaviour depends on 
understanding how social identities affect both interests and action.131 
In this framework, the UN emerges as more than a simple agent of the states. It 
is capable of defining problems and articulating, introducing and promoting norms, and 
of affecting the behaviour and attitude of the states. The lines between lex lata and lege 
ferenda, and between law of the Organization and that of the international community, 
may blur as emerging norms become stronger, and as they merge and reinforce each 
other. As explained, there is fluidity between non-law and law, and law of the 
organization with that of the community. Rather than searching for coherent behaviour 
in respect to an emerging norm of CIL, it may be more revealing to search for 
ambivalent behaviour that suggests that the norm is progressively emerging and 
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progressively being used as CIL. It is necessary to look at the manner that general 
attitude changes in respect to the behaviour that the norm authorizes, commands or 
prohibits.  
Consequently, the sociological, constructivist approach adopted in this work is 
capable of better explaining the formation of CIL, in contrast with the more formalist 
and state-centred approach adopted by the SR and the ILC. Granted, the latter is 
concerned with the identification of CIL – however it is not possible to clearly 
differentiate between emerging and extant CIL. Consequently, some of the conclusions 
that the ILC reaches may jeopardise the identification of emerging norms or make the 
exercise more cumbersome. This is the case of the formal separation of the 
ascertainment of identification of practice and opinio,132 the decrease of the importance 
of inconsistent practice and opinio,133 and, above all, the extremely cautious approach 
to international organizations, and non-state actors in general.134 In concluding this 
article, I suggest that further research should look at the topic of the institutionalisation 
of emerging norms, and how the UN may foster the emergence of new CIL by 
establishing institutional frameworks. In looking at this topic, one must bear in mind 
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